With decades of experience navigating the complexities of global logistics, Rohit Laila has a unique vantage point on the turbulence currently roiling the maritime shipping industry. His career, spanning the intricate dance of supply chain management and final-mile delivery, is marked by a keen eye for the intersection of technology, innovation, and real-world operational challenges. We sit down with him to unpack the recent series of bewildering decisions and divergent strategies from the world’s largest shipping alliances. Our conversation explores the delicate balance of risk and reward in the Red Sea, the operational chess match behind the Ocean Alliance’s dual-routing strategy, and the critical steps shippers must now take to survive the whiplash of carrier unpredictability.
The Ocean Alliance has announced it will continue using the Cape of Good Hope route from April 2026 while also detailing alternative Suez Canal options. What specific operational preparations and triggers would be needed for the alliance to activate that Suez contingency plan?
Publishing a dual set of routings is a sophisticated move, but flipping the switch back to Suez is far more complex than just changing a map. First, you’d need a sustained period of verified security. We’re not talking about a week of calm, but concrete, actionable intelligence from multiple security partners indicating a dramatic and stable reduction in threat levels. Operationally, the alliance would need to re-coordinate with the Suez Canal Authority, realign vessel schedules across all eleven affected services, and re-sequence port calls—for example, the Suez version of the EM1 loop adds stops in Port Said West and Mersin. This requires immense back-end work, from adjusting fuel procurement strategies to communicating new transit times to thousands of customers. The trigger won’t be a single event, but a carefully weighed consensus that the financial and time savings of the canal outweigh the residual security risks.
On the same day the Alliance confirmed its Cape strategy, member CMA CGM reversed its decision to bring three services back to Suez. What does this rapid pivot signal about the current intelligence and security assessments for the Red Sea region?
It signals that the intelligence is volatile, highly fluid, and likely conflicting. For a major carrier like CMA CGM, which had been the most aggressive in returning to the Red Sea, to abruptly reverse course on its FAL 1, FAL 3, and MEX services speaks volumes. This isn’t a decision made lightly; it’s a response to a perceived spike in risk that outweighed the commercial benefits they had already calculated. The fact that security analysts couldn’t pinpoint a single public event tells me the decision was likely based on specific, non-public intelligence regarding threat capabilities or intentions. It’s a stark reminder that even with naval escorts, the situation is a knife’s edge, and the risk calculus can change not just day-to-day, but hour-to-hour.
With some major carriers like CMA CGM reverting to the Cape route, shippers face significant unpredictability. What are the three most critical steps shippers should take right now to mitigate risks and build resilience into their supply chains amid these fluctuating carrier decisions?
First, shippers must intensify communication with their carriers and forwarders. Don’t just rely on automated updates; demand clarity on contingency plans and decision-making triggers for specific trade lanes. Second, they need to build buffer stock at key nodes. The extended transit times around the Cape are one thing, but the constant flip-flopping erodes any semblance of schedule reliability. Having that extra inventory can absorb the shock of a vessel that’s suddenly rerouted. Finally, shippers should actively diversify their carrier portfolio. Relying on a single alliance, or even a single carrier within an alliance, is incredibly risky right now. Spreading cargo across carriers with different risk tolerances—some using the Cape, others attempting Suez—can hedge against disruptions on any single route.
We are seeing divergent strategies, with Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd planning a limited Suez return while the Ocean Alliance holds back. What different risk calculations and commercial pressures are driving these opposing approaches, and which strategy do you believe will prove more sustainable?
The divergent strategies reflect different corporate cultures, customer bases, and intelligence sources. Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd, with their new Gemini Cooperation, seem to be taking a surgical approach, testing the waters with a single service like the India-Middle East-Mediterranean loop. This allows them to signal a return to normalcy to their clients on that specific lane while containing the risk to a smaller number of vessels. The Ocean Alliance, a much larger and more diverse grouping with members like COSCO and Evergreen, is likely operating on a consensus model that defaults to the most conservative, safety-first approach. Their decision to stick with the Cape route for all seven Asia-Europe and four Asia-Med services prioritizes crew and cargo safety above all else. In the short term, the cautious Cape strategy is more sustainable because it offers predictability, even if it’s a slower, more expensive predictability. The Suez strategy will only become sustainable once the security situation stabilizes definitively.
The prolonged use of the Cape of Good Hope route significantly alters transit times and port rotations, as seen in the published service loops. How does this sustained disruption impact port congestion and infrastructure on both the Asian and European ends of the trade lane?
The impact is profound and creates a bullwhip effect across the system. On the Asian end, vessels departing for Europe are on a much longer journey, which initially frees up some berthing space. However, it also means the return journey is longer, causing delays in getting empty containers back to export hubs like Shanghai, Ningbo, and Yantian, leading to equipment shortages. On the European end, the problem is vessel bunching. Because the Cape route throws schedules off, ports like Rotterdam, Felixstowe, and Hamburg experience waves of arrivals rather than a steady flow. A terminal expecting five ships in a week might get three in two days and then none for the next five. This overwhelms yard capacity, strains labor and equipment, and creates significant downstream delays for rail and truck connections.
What is your forecast for the stability of Asia-Europe and Asia-Mediterranean shipping routes over the next 12 months?
I believe the next 12 months will be defined by a tense and unstable dual-system. The Cape of Good Hope will remain the baseline, the default safe route that underpins the majority of services. However, we will continue to see carriers make opportunistic, limited-service transits of the Suez Canal during perceived lulls in hostilities. This will create a “have and have-not” situation for shippers, where some get the benefit of a faster transit while many others are stuck on the long route. True stability—a full, confident return to the Suez Canal for all major alliances—is unlikely within this timeframe. The underlying geopolitical conflict shows no signs of resolution, so the industry will have to institutionalize this unpredictability, building it into contracts and operational planning for the foreseeable future.
